The battle of Granicus, 334 BC.

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

"Alexander, son of Philipp, and the Greeks, except of Lacedaemonians, from the barbarians who live in Asia". 

(«Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων»-"Alexandros Philippou kai hoi Hellēnes plēn Lakedaimoniōn apo tōn barbarōn tōn tēn Asian katoikountōn")

Charles Le Brun, Le Passage du Granique, 1665

Of the four great battles Alexander fought in the course of his brilliant military career, the Battle of the Granicus, fought in May 334 BC, was the first–and the one in which he came closest to failure and death. The Granicus is also worthy of note because it is one of the earliest battles on record that was decided largely by cavalry strength, though coordinated with infantry support. Although some of the tactical details of the fighting are reasonably clear, to this day one of the more puzzling aspects is Alexander’s strategy of opening the battle with a feint attack. Unfortunately, the three major ancient literary sources–Arrian, Diodorus and Plutarch–give very little real detail of the battle, focusing rather on Alexander’s heroic struggle. Nevertheless, by carefully reviewing those literary sources, a highly probable picture of the battle emerges.

After the death of his father, King Philip II, in 336 BC, Alexander III won the allegiance of the army and ascended to the throne of Macedon at age 20, only to find himself at the head of a rebellious kingdom. The sudden death of his father had encouraged the barbarians to the north and west–and several Greek cities to the south–to revolt against Macedonian rule. Within two years, Alexander had suppressed all internal opposition, crushed the barbarian revolts in decisive campaigns and subdued the Greek insurrection. Once he had consolidated his power at home, Alexander enthusiastically took on the project his father had planned but never carried out–an invasion of the Persian empire.

For well over a century, the Persians’ increasing interference in Greek mainland affairs, their oppression of Greek coastal cities in western Asia Minor and their repeated invasions of Greece had filled the Greeks with fear and loathing. In the spring of 334 BC, Alexander led a combined Macedonian, Greek and Balkan (historically referred to as Macedonian) army of 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry on a 20-day march from Macedon to the Hellespont (today called the Dardanelles). Alexander knew that agents sent by King Darius III of Persia had had much to do with inciting the Greeks against him. To his personal desire for revenge, he now harnessed to his cause the Greeks’ grievances over Persian injustices done to them, past and present.

 Crossing of the Granicus, Gérard Audran after Charles Le Brun, 1672

Prior to Alexander’s Hellespont crossing, the Persian satraps (provincial governors) and others in the Persian high command assembled their forces of about 10,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry near the town of Zelea in western Asia Minor (present-day Turkey). A council of war–to which Memnon, a high-ranking Greek mercenary in Persian service, was admitted–was held to discuss strategy. Knowing that the Macedonian army would be a formidable adversary, Memnon advised the Persians to burn crops, farms and villages in the country through which Alexander would have to pass, thereby depriving him of provisions, while the Persian army withdrew eastward and avoided battle. The satraps, however, distrusted Memnon because he was a Greek, and they were reluctant to see their territories destroyed. Consequently, they rejected his sound advice and decided to stay to defend their provinces.

The Persian nobles believed themselves superior to the barbaric invaders and counted on a full array of western satraps, a numerically superior cavalry (which for generations was reputed to be the finest in existence), a formidable contingent of Greek mercenary infantry and a sound plan to stop the invasion at the onset. They seem to have had two major objectives. First, they would strategically force Alexander toward a carefully chosen position before he could move farther inland; if he did not move toward that position, he would leave his rear unprotected and possibly lose his logistical support and lines of communication with the Hellespont. Second, the Persians hoped to find a strong defensive position that would not only compel Alexander to attack but also minimize his more than 2-to-1 advantage in infantry, while capitalizing on their 2-to-1 advantage in cavalry.

In keeping with their plan, the Persians advanced from Zelea to the nearby Granicus River (today called the Kocabas Cay). The 60- to 90-foot-wide river, with its varying depth, strong current and steep, irregular bank, would pose a significant obstacle to Alexander’s cavalry and would make it difficult for his phalanxes to hold formation. The Persians established a strong defensive position on the eastern bank and placed all their cavalry in the front line, creating as wide a front as possible–approximately 7,500 feet, or 1.4 miles. There, they confidently awaited the Macedonian army’s arrival.

Diodorus is the only ancient author who provides even a partial Persian order of battle: Memnon of Rhodes, with a cavalry unit of unknown size and nationality, held the extreme left of the Persian forward line.

Diodorus Siculus, Book XVII

Alexander welcomed the prediction of the seer and made a splendid sacrifice to Athena, dedicating his own armour to the goddess. Then, taking the finest of the panoplies deposited in the temple, he put it on and used it in his first battle.1 And this he did in fact decide through his own personal fighting ability and won a resounding victory. But this did not take place till a few days later.  Meanwhile, the Persian satraps and generals had not acted in time to prevent the crossing of the Macedonians,2 but they mustered their forces and took counsel how to oppose Alexander. Memnon, the Rhodian, famed for his military competence, advocated a policy of not fighting a pitched battle, but of stripping the countryside and through the shortage of supplies preventing the Macedonians from advancing further, while at the same time they sent naval and land forces across to Macedonia and transferred the impact of war to Europe.3  This was the best counsel, as after-events made clear, but, for all that, Memnon failed to win over the other commanders, since his advice seemed beneath the dignity of the Persians. So they decided to fight it out, and summoning forces from every quarter and heavily outnumbering the Macedonians, they advanced in the direction of Hellespontine Phrygia. They pitched camp by the river Granicus, using the bed of the river as a line of defence.

1 Cp. chap. 21.2, below, and Arrian. 1.11.7-8, who states that the arms were carried before him into battle. The shield was carried by Peucestes in the assault on the citadel of the Malli in 325 (Arrian. 6.9.3). 
2 The battle of the Granicus is described by Justin 11.6.8-13, Plut. Alexander 16, and Arrian. 1.12.6-16.7. A good analysis of this and Alexander's other battles is given by Major General J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (1958).
3 Arrian. 1.12.9. Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1989. 

When Alexander learned of the concentration of the Persian forces, he advanced rapidly and encamped opposite the enemy, so that the Granicus flowed between the encampments.  The Persians, resting on high ground, made no move, intending to fall upon the foe as he crossed the river, for they supposed they could easily carry the day when the Macedonian phalanx was divided.  But Alexander at dawn boldly brought his army across the river and deployed in good order before they could stop him.1 In return, they posted their mass of horsemen all along the front of the Macedonians since they had decided to press the battle with these. Memnon of Rhodes and the satrap Arsamenes held the left wing each with his own cavalry; Arsites was stationed next with the horsemen from Paphlagonia; then came Spithrobates satrap of Ionia at the head of the Hyrcanian cavalry. The right wing was held by a thousand Medes and two thousand horse with Rheomithres as well as Bactrians of like number.3 Other national contingents occupied the centre, numerous and picked for their valour. In all, the cavalry amounted to more than ten thousand.  The Persian foot soldiers were not fewer than one hundred thousand,4 but they were posted behind the line and did not advance since the cavalry was thought to be sufficient to crush the Macedonians. As the horse of each side joined battle spiritedly, the Thessalian cavalry posted on the left wing under the command of Parmenion gallantly met the attack of the troops posted opposite them; and Alexander, who had the finest of the riders on the right wing with him, personally led the attack upon the Persians and closing with them, began to inflict substantial losses upon them. 

 1 This account of the battle differs from that of Arrian 1.13 in two respects which cannot be reconciled. There, the attack takes place in the late afternoon and in the lower course of the Granicus, where the river flows through relatively flat country but in a deep and muddy bed. He, as Plutarch also (Plut. Alexander 16), describes the action as taking place between Macedonians trying to cross and Persians holding the river bank. Diodorus, in contrast, places the battle at dawn, and lets the Macedonians cross without difficulty and engage the Persians on the far bank. Probably he located the battle further upstream, in the foothills. According to Plut. Alexander 16.2, the battle would have occurred in the Macedonian month Daesius, but as that was unlucky militarily, Alexander ordered the intercalation of a second Artemisius. See further Book 16.94.3, note. 
2 The novelty of this arrangement consisted in the fact that each army placed its cavalry in front at the point of contact. This may not have been specifically planned. Alexander threw his cavalry across the river to gain a bridgehead, and the Persians naturally countered with their cavalry, so that a piecemeal engagement followed. 
 3 Arsites was the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and Spithridates of Lydia and Ionia (Arrian. 1.12.8). Arrian names these Persians and adds Petines and Niphates, but does not give the Persian order of battle. He gives that of the Macedonians, which Diodorus omits, in 1.14.1-3. Arsamenes (Arsames, Curtius 3.4.3; Arrian. 2.4.5) was satrap of Cilicia. 4 Justin 11.6.11 gives the Persian strength as 600,000, Arrian. 1.14.4 as 20,000 foot and 20,000 horse. 5 This comment is a rationalization after the event. The Persian infantry would not move up to meet the Macedonian cavalry.

To his right was Arsamenes, also with cavalry of unknown size and nationality; then Arsites, with Paphlagonian cavalry of unknown size; and Spithridates, with Hyrcanian cavalry of unknown size. The extreme right of the Persian forward line was held by 1,000 Median cavalry and 2,000 cavalry of unknown nationality, both under the command of Rheomithres, and by 2,000 Bactrian cavalry. The center was held by cavalry units of unknown size and nationality, probably under the joint command of Mithridates and Rhoesaces, and no doubt others not mentioned in ancient texts. Greek mercenaries, under Omares, made up the mass of the infantry and were placed at the rear of the cavalry on higher ground.

Some military historians have interpreted the Persian battle array as a tactical blunder. They argue that, by placing the cavalry so close to the steep riverbank, the Persians deprived it of the opportunity to charge; and the infantry, in the rear of the cavalry, became mere observers of a struggle in which they could offer little assistance. One of the greatest of Alexander’s modern biographers, Sir William Tarn, disagreed, however, stating that ‘the Persian leaders had in fact a very gallant plan; they meant if possible to strangle the war at birth by killing Alexander.’

In ancient times, the commander’s personal leadership and presence in the forefront of battle were so important that his sudden loss, especially at the beginning of the combat, would have a demoralizing effect, possibly causing his army to panic and flee soon after his death. Thus, it seems likely that, by placing their cavalrymen in the front, the Persian leaders intended to meet Alexander’s cavalry charge with their numerically–and, they believed, qualitatively–superior cavalry and simply overwhelm his horsemen.

While the Macedonian army was completing its crossing into Asia Minor, Alexander, accompanied by a portion of his royal guards, sailed ahead, steering south to visit the ruins of the nearby ancient city of Troy. There, he ceremoniously made sacrifices to the gods in honor of the legendary Greek heroes who had fallen nearly 1,000 years earlier in the Trojan War–Greece’s first known invasion of Asia.

Upon rejoining his main army, Alexander received intelligence that the Persian forces were some 50 miles to the northeast. He realized that his first objective could no longer be to move south to liberate the Greek cities under Persian control, since that would leave a substantial enemy force in his rear. Instead, he marched northeastward along the shore of the Hellespont and the Propontis (the present-day Sea of Marmara) with just more than 18,000 of his finest troops (13,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry), ready to challenge the Persians to a pitched battle.

In midafternoon on the third day of marching, Alexander was not far from the Granicus when his scouts reported that the Persian army was drawn up on the east bank of the river. As the Macedonian army marched toward the river through open country, Alexander placed his heavy infantry in the center in two tandem columns, heavy cavalry on each flank and the baggage train in the rear; he then advanced in semideployment behind a heavy screen of light cavalry and infantry.

When Macedonian General Parmenion, Alexander’s second-in-command, could see the enemy’s line, he studied their forces on the far bank, as well as the topography, and advised caution. He disagreed with Alexander about the battle plan, pointing out the difficulties in the river crossing and warning that an immediate attack invited disaster. Alexander, however, rejected Parmenion’s advice, perhaps wanting to capitalize on the Persians’ error in tactical deployment, and decided to deploy his army to attack at once.

In the center of his line, Alexander placed his six Foot Companion battalions of heavy infantry (historically referred to as phalanxes), arranged in the following order from left to right: Meleager’s phalanx with 1,500 infantrymen; the phalanx of Philip, son of Amyntas, with 1,500 infantrymen; the phalanx of Amyntas, son of Andromenes, with 1,500 infantrymen; Craterus’ phalanx, with 1,500 infantrymen; the phalanx of Coenus, son of Polemocrates, with 1,500 infantrymen; and the phalanx of Perdiccas, son of Orontes, with 1,500 infantrymen. On the left of the phalanxes stood 150 Thracian Odrysian light cavalry under Agathon and 600 Greek allied heavy cavalry under Philip, son of Menelaus. On the extreme left of Alexander’s line were 1,800 Thessalian heavy cavalry under Calas, joined by Parmenion, who probably stationed himself at the head of the Pharsalian squadron. On the right of the phalanxes stood, in succession: 3,000 shield bearers divided into three phalanxes of 1,000 heavy infantrymen each, all under Nicanor, son of Parmenion; a combined light mounted force of 600 Prodromoi cavalry and 150 Paeonian cavalry, commanded by Amyntas, son of Arrhabaeus; one squadron of 200 Companion heavy cavalry under Socrates, whose turn it was to take the lead that day; 1,600 Companion heavy cavalry (with Alexander stationed at the head of the royal squadron), under Philotas, son of Parmenion; 500 Agrianian light-javelin men, under Attalus; and, finally, 500 Cretan light archers, under Clearchus.

For the purpose of command, the army was divided into two wings. The right, commanded by Alexander, consisted of the three right Foot Companion phalanxes and everything to their right; while Parmenion commanded the three left Foot Companion phalanxes and everything to their left.

As the Battle of the Granicus began, the Persian leaders, in keeping with their plan to kill Alexander, focused on the Macedonian commander in chief’s movements. The glitter of his magnificent armor, the white plumes on helmet and his entourage made him a conspicuous target. When the Persians observed Alexander at the head of the Companion cavalry on the right flank, they concluded that his intention was to attack their left. As a result, the Persians transferred some of their cavalry regiments from their center and left center and massed them on and above the riverbank opposite Alexander to meet what they expected would be his main assault.

Once the final Persian and Macedonian battle arrays were complete, the two armies paused a moment and faced each other in silence. Then Alexander opened the battle by sending forward an advance force under the command of Amyntas. Three contingents of cavalry–the combined Prodromoi and Paeonian force, along with Socrates’ Companion squadron–totaling 950 horsemen, and one phalanx of infantry (1,000 soldiers) made a feint attack on the Persians’ extreme left flank, with Socrates’ squadron leading the way.

The Battle of Granicus, 334 B.C.
Alexander	Persians
Cavalry
5000	15000
Hoplits
22000	8000
Peltasts
13000	9500

The forces.

Not much had changed in the Persian army. They still had massive numbers of cavalry and archers. One thing that they had learned of the Persian wars was that the Greek hoplite was absolutly superior to the Persian infantery. Luckily for them was the beginning of the fourth century the time of mercenaries, and many Greeks were willing to serve in a foreign army as long as they got their share of the booty. The experienced Greek phalanx combined with the motivated Persian cavalry made the Persian army not only a huge army, but also a fearsome army.

The Macedonian army also used lots of mercenaries. The biggest problem with mercenaries was their morale, and that they did not a shared goal besides money. An army that only consisted of citizens always had ideals, and because of these ideals was the morale often high. Alexander managed to keep his army together thanks to his leadership, but most of all because of his bravery.

Alexanders forces were very experienced, and many of them can be seen as elite units. This is characteristic for the armies of Alexander as he always used many elite units as they could form an agema. Agema was the Greek word for 'that, what is being led', but the Macedonians changed its meaning into 'that what leads'. When you know this it is not surprising that an agema was the spearhead of an army. There several agemas in his army: one for the hysapists, one for the royal cavalry, one for the light cavalry, etcetera. But Alexander did not only use hysapists and cavalry: we also hear of archers, peltasts, hoplites, engineers, slingers, and javelin-throwers. His army was versatile and very mobile.

The commanders.

Unfortunately we know very little of the satraps who decided to wait for Alexander with an army. They had played an insignificant role in history until then.

About Alexander we know much more, but not only because of his impressive achievements. Alexander was only twenty when his father was murdered, but young Alexander was already prepared for the duty which was waiting for him. At the age of sixteen he had already led an army against Thracian tribes when his father was away, and he even destroyed their capitol. During the battle of Chaeronea he was in command of the decissive blow against the 'Devoted Brothers in Arms'. And after his fathers death he showed once again that he was the leader Macedon had been waiting for.

As a commander Alexander did not only have a lot of knowledge, but he also dared to improvise on critical moments. During an expedition against Thracian tribes the Thracians attempted to crush his troops by pushing wagons down a hill. Alexander quickly opened his formation so that the wagons could go through, and were this was not possible he ordered his man to lay down on the ground with their shields on their back. There were no Macedonian casualities. On another occassion he crossed the Donau much earlier than expected by confiscating all local ships for the transport of his troops.

He was not only a splendid commander, but he also tried to be a Greek as much as possible. During his youth he had been taught be the great Greek philosopher Aristotle, and everybody knew that Alexander was fascinated by the Greek culture, and especially the books of Homer. At the end he no longer wanted to be just a Greek as he claimed to be a Greek god, a son on Zeus. That is why it seems weird that he started to wear Persian clothes after the defeat of the Persian empire. His admiration for the Greek culture was genuine, while his orientalism was most likely more because of political reasons... in an attempt to unite a massive empire.

It was not the only dualism in the character of Alexander. He was strong enough to survive any difficulty, and brave enough to always fight in the front of a battle, but also weak enough to drink too much alcohol which made him commit acts of brutality. At a certain moment he was drunk once more and murdered his old friend Clitus, while he ordered to burn Persepolis on another occassion even though he wanted to unite the old Persian empire under his leadership. He treated Darius' with all the possible respect, but he also killed all survivors of Tyrus, Gaza, and Thebes. We know of all this, but we are unable to explain these actions of Alexander.

Phase one: entering the Persian empire.

After Alexander had crossed the Hellespont with his army his first concern was to secure the coast of the Aegean. If he failed to do this very quickly then there was the danger that the Persian fleet might sail out an attack Macedon which was rather vulnerable now. However, he could impossibly go further south with the army of the Persian satraps to the east of him. They could attack him in the side, or wait till he had passed by and attack him in the back after they had cut him off his supplies.

Alexander moved his army along the southern coast of the Hellespont and sent several scouts ahead of his army. The usage of scouts had often been neglected by Greek commanders, it would have prevented the Athenian defeat at Aegospotamoi for example, but Alexander had been taught very well and he knew exactly what he was doing. The scouts came back after they had located the Persian army and reported that it was most likely the same size as the Macedonian army, but they had fewer footsoldiers.

Phase two: the barrier called Granicus.

The Persian cavalry had already reached the river Granicus before Alexander could cross it. The Persians had installed them on the higher side of the riverbanks, and waited for the slower phalanx to reinforce their position. Several of Alexanders commanders wanted to wait and see what would happen, but Alexander wanted to attack immedeatly before the Greek mercenaries would join up with the Persian cavalry on the riverbanks. Again Alexander sent out his scouts and they found several places where the river could be crossed.

 The first to attack were his light cavalry and troops on his right wing. The Persian attacked them from the high riverbanks with javelins and arrows while they were crossing the river, but even the light cavalry was well armoured so there were not many casualities. Alexander had ordered his forces to cross the Granicus under an angle, so that the stream pushed them forwards. This way they were able to cross the river quite fast, but it also was very hard for the Persians to anticipate where they would land. The light cavalry and infantry landed at a place with lower riverbanks, and they were immedeatly attacked by the light Persian cavalry. 

Alexander saw that his troops were having a hard time on the other side of the river, and that many of them were killed. Immedeatly he crossed the river with his heavy cavalry, and attacked at the same place. He let the Persian light cavalry to his troops who had first crossed the Granicus, and attacked the Persain heavy cavalry himself. The Macedonian cavalry had an advantage over the Persians as they used long spears, instead of short javelins as most Persians did. On the other hand had the Persians their scimitars, and Alexander was even almost killed by one of them.
Alexander manages to break through the Persian formation which was commanded by the satrap Spithridates. Now the Persian light cavalry on the left wing has no longer the support of the heavy cavalry and they can no longer withstand the furious Macedonian attacks. They flee, while the hysapists also cross the Granicus and attack Spithridates and his heavy cavalry. A man-to-man fight starts on the riverbanks between the hysapists and the Persian heavy cavalry. Spithridates is killed during this fight, and the position for the Persian becomes even more hopeless when Alexander himself threatens to attack them in the rear. The Persian formation breaks again in that area, and suddenly every Persian is running for his life.

Once more Alexander charges forward together with his elite heavy cavalry and pins down the advancing Greek mercenaries who had now reached a small hill. The rest of the Macedonian army had now also crossed the Granicus and the light cavalry and infantry were hunting down the fleeing enemy while the Macedonian phalanx and hysapists were moving towards the hill. The light infantry and archers who had been accompanying the Greek phalanx are forced to retreat together with half of the phalanx, while the rest of the phalanx is encircled on the hill by the Macedonian phalanx and hysapists. Alexander refuses to accept the surrender of these Greek 'traitors' as he is determined to set an example. When 2000 of them are left he ends the battle, captures them, and sends them to Macedon where they have to pay for their treachery by hard labour.
The results of the battle.
Memnon, one of the commanders of the Greek mercenaries, had survived the battle as he had not participated in it. The Persians no longer trusted him after he had told them that it was not wise to force Alexander into a battle at the Granicus. He wanted to avoid a direct battle, combined with the tactics of the scorched earth. At the same time all naval bases at the Aegean had to be reinforced, and Alexander had to be cut off from the sea, and thus his supplies. Darius had much faith in Memnon when he heard of his plans, and gave Memnon orders to realize his plans.
Nevertheless managed Alexander to take many coastal places without much effort, and he also dominated the important road to Sardes. Milete refused to let Alexander inside the walls in the hope that the Phoenician and Cypriotic ships in Mycale would help. Alexander took the city before any help had arrived at the battlefield. Memnon retreated to Halikarnassos and reinforced it immensly. Again Alexander managed to take this city and now Memnon was forced to retreat to islands in the Aegean. Here he created several bases which not only formed a threat for the side of Alexanders army, but they were also meant for a counterattack on Macedon and Hellas. Unfortunately for the Persians he died because of a disease before this attack was launched.
The successors of Memnon continued his strategy for some time, but they realised that an attack on Hellas was useless after Antipater, who was governor of Macedon during Alexanders absence, had shown his power. The battle against Alexander would be continued inside the Persian empire instead of in Macedon...

Arrian, a 2nd-century Greek historian whose account of the battle is the most comprehensive and reliable, described the hard-fought cavalry action that ensued in the river and on its bank: ‘At the point where the vanguard under Amyntas and Socrates touched the bank, the Persians shot volleys on them from above, some hurling their javelins into the river from their commanding position on the bank, others going down to the stream on the more level ground.

Arrian,Anabasis

[6]ὁ δὲ καὶ τῶν Περσῶν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἔθαψεν: ἔθαψε δὲ καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, οἳ ξὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις στρατεύοντες ἀπέθανον: ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν πέδαις εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο.

[7] ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀθήνας τριακοσίας πανοπλίας Περσικὰς ἀνάθημα εἶναι τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἐν πόλει: καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπιγραφῆναι ἐκέλευσε τόδε: Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων.
καταστήσας δὲ Κάλαν σατραπεύειν ἧς Ἀρσίτης ἦρχε καὶ τοὺς φόρους τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποφέρειν τάξας, οὕσπερ Δαρείῳ ἔφερον, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατιόντες ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐνεχείριζον σφᾶς, τούτους μὲν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάστους ἐκέλευεν,
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk

There was a great shoving by the cavalry, as some were trying to get out of the river, others to stop them, great showers of Persian javelins, much thrusting of Macedonian spears. But the Macedonians, much outnumbered, came off badly in the first onslaught; they were defending themselves from the river on ground that was not firm and was beneath the enemy’s while the Persians had the advantage of the bank; in particular, the flower of the Persian cavalry was posted here, and Memnon’s sons and Memnon himself ventured their lives with them. The first Macedonians who came to grips with the Persians were cut down, despite their valor.’

Although the relatively weak Macedonian advance force met with predictably intense resistance and suffered heavy losses, it succeeded in drawing the Persian left-flank cavalry out of their formations. Once that was achieved, Alexander, with trumpets blaring his commands, launched his main assault, leading his famous Companion cavalry, the elite of the army, forward toward the now-disorganized Persian cavalry. With Alexander at the head of the royal squadron, the six other Companion cavalry squadrons crossed the river and fought their way up its eastern bank, as the Persians hurled their javelins down upon them.

Arrian described the fighting at that point: ‘Though the fighting was on horseback, it was more like an infantry battle, horse entangled with horse, man with man in the struggle, the Macedonians trying to push the Persians once and for all from the bank and force them on to the level ground, the Persians trying to bar their landing and thrust them back again into the river.’ Meanwhile, the remainder of Alexander’s right wing–the Agrianian javelin men, Cretan archers, two phalanxes of shield bearers and three right phalanxes of Foot Companions–also advanced, with trumpets and battle cries resounding as they entered the river.

When the Persian leaders recognized Alexander, they rode to engage him in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle. The battle became a series of heroic duels between individuals rather than a fight between cavalry units. During the struggle, Alexander’s long Macedonian cavalry lance, or sarissa, was splintered, and he called upon Aretas, one of his Companions, to provide him with another. Aretas’ own weapon had suffered the same misfortune, so Alexander continued fighting bravely with the aftpoint (sauroter). He had no sooner received another sarissa from the Companion Demaratus than the Persian cavalry commander Mithridates appeared at the head of a squadron. Alexander rode forward and struck the Persian leader in the face with his sarissa, killing him instantly.

Rhoesaces, another Persian nobleman, rode up and with his scimitar sliced off part of Alexander’s helmet, causing a minor wound. Then Alexander drove his sarissa through Rhoesaces’ breastplate and into his chest, bringing him to the ground. A third Persian leader, Spithridates, was close behind Alexander and raised his scimitar to strike, but Cleitus, commander of the royal squadron to whom the king’s safety was entrusted, anticipated the blow and severed the Persian’s sword arm, saving Alexander’s life.

Although the Persians maintained a vigorous resistance throughout the bitter struggle, they failed to withstand the charge of the Companion cavalry and were continually pushed back. Arrian wrote, ‘The Persians were now being roughly handled from all quarters; they and their horses were struck in the face with lances [sarissas], they were being pushed back by the [Companion] cavalry, and were suffering heavily from the light troops, who had intermingled with the cavalry.’ With the Companion cavalry’s fierce onslaught opening the way, the remainder of Alexander’s right wing crossed the Granicus. They slowly but steadily drove the Persians farther back, gaining the level ground above the steep riverbank.

Meanwhile, Parmenion’s left wing had also advanced and secured a footing. According to Diodorus, the Thessalian cavalry ‘won a great reputation for valor because of the skillful handling of their squadrons and their unmatched fighting quality.’ Although there are no details about the role of Parmenion’s left wing in the battle, its advance was probably delayed until Alexander’s attack was well underway. At the later great battles of Issus and Gaugamela, the Macedonians used a strong defensive left wing at the onset of the battle to balance and safeguard their bold offensive operations on the right.

As a result of the loss of so many of its leaders, the opposition offered by the Persian cavalry deteriorated rapidly. The Persian line first began to give way at the point where Alexander was engaged; then the whole center collapsed. Once the center had caved in, both wings of the Persian cavalry–Memnon among them–panicked and fled. The Macedonians could not pursue the fleeing cavalry very far, however. The Persian Greek mercenary infantry, who up to that point had taken no part in the battle, still held their ground and stood in Alexander’s path. The mercenary contingent (perhaps 3,000 troops) presented Alexander with terms under which it would surrender, but he rejected them and ordered his phalanxes to attack the mercenaries in the front, while his cavalry assaulted them on their unprotected flanks and rear. With the exception of 2,000 prisoners–and possibly a few others who threw themselves on the ground and concealed themselves among the dead–the mercenaries were cut down.

The ancient historians’ accounts vary widely as to the losses on both sides. In view of the swiftness of the battle, Arrian probably provided the most credible statistics, although the Macedonian figures are suspiciously low and the Persian numbers perhaps slightly elevated. According to him, Macedonian losses totaled 115 killed–85 cavalry (including 25 Companions from Socrates’ squadron, who fell in the advance force) and 30 infantry. No doubt the number of wounded was considerably higher. Persian losses amounted to 4,000 killed–about 1,000 cavalry and perhaps 3,000 Greek mercenaries–along with 2,000 taken prisoner.

Among the Persian high command known to have died in the attempt to slay Alexander were: Spithridates, satrap of Ionia and Lydia; Mithrobuzanes, satrap of Cappadocia; Mithridates, son-in-law of King Darius; Arbupales, grandson of King Artaxerxes II; Phranaces, brother-in-law of King Darius; Rhoesaces, brother of Spithridates; Omares, commander of the Greek mercenaries; Niphates, perhaps a cavalry commander; Petines, perhaps a cavalry commander; and Arsites, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (the province in which the battle took place), who fled and later committed suicide, according to Arrian, ‘because the blame of the present blunder seemed to the Persians to lie at his door.’

By Alexander’s order, all who had fallen in the Battle of the Granicus, including the Persian leaders and Greek mercenaries, were buried with military honors. To the surviving relatives of his fallen soldiers, Alexander granted immunity from taxation and public service. He ordered Lysippus, considered perhaps the greatest sculptor of the day, to make bronze statues of the 25 Companion cavalrymen who fell in the initial feint attack. The statues were eventually set up in Dium, a city in Macedon at the foot of Mount Olympus. Alexander visited his wounded, examined their injuries and, according to Arrian, gave every soldier an opportunity to recount–and perhaps exaggerate–his deeds.

The Persian commanders had not kept pace with military developments in Greece, including the tactics and quality of the Macedonian army, in the two decades prior to Alexander’s invasion. Believing themselves to be a match for Alexander in the field, the Persians, who failed to use their professional infantry, simply counted on their numerically superior cavalry and their personal bravery to secure a victory. The resulting lack of coordination between horse and foot violated a principle of integrated armies that even the Persians had long understood.

According to historian E.W. Davis, however, the Persians’ greatest weakness was that the ‘Persian army seems to have been commanded by a committee [and] it may be that we do not have a Persian battle-plan at all, only a blotched compromise between several rival plans.’ The Persian defeat, resulting in the loss of so many satraps and others in the Persian high command, was so overwhelming that no other army could be reassembled to challenge Alexander in all of Asia Minor.

On the other hand, the Battle of the Granicus highlighted Alexander’s remarkable insights into the development of the battle, his anticipation of the enemy’s reactions, his sense of timing, and especially his coordination of heavy infantry, heavy cavalry, light cavalry and light infantry in a single attack. Alexander calculated that, although his cavalry was outnumbered 2-to-1, it was superior in skill and discipline. His cavalrymen were shock troops, armed with long sarissas, and were more accustomed to strong hand-to-hand fighting than were the Persian cavalrymen. The latter were armed with short javelins (designed more for throwing than for thrusting) and scimitars, both of which were ineffective against the Macedonian sarissas.

Alexander also realized that his attacking cavalry had a great advantage over its Persian counterpart, whose defensive role forfeited its mobility and whose faulty deployment negated its advantage in numbers. Alexander’s light infantry archers and javelin men, interspersed among his Companion cavalry, also inflicted much damage and further helped to offset the Persian cavalry’s numerical superiority.

Alexander’s heroic leadership, as he fought in the thick of battle and narrowly escaped death, earned him what Diodorus called the ‘palm for bravery’ and gave him his first great victory over the Persians, opening the way to western and southern Asia Minor. From the spoils of that success, Alexander sent 300 suits of Persian armor to the Parthenon in Athens, to remind the Greeks that this victory was part of the war of revenge against the Persians and to stir Greek enthusiasm. With the triumph at the Granicus, the Greek cities of Asia Minor were liberated from Persian rule–and the beachhead was established for later campaigns deeper in Persian territory.

Sources / Bibliography / Photos

Arrian 1.16.45 - 50,Anabasis Alexandri
Diodorus Siculus, Book XVII 

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John R. Mixter
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