The Siege of Rhodes 1522

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

Wars Of Hellas

The Siege of Rhodes of 1522 was the second and ultimately successful attempt by the Ottoman Empire to expel the Knights of Rhodes from their island stronghold and thereby secure Ottoman control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The first siege in 1480 had been unsuccessful.

1480 Siege of Rhodes depictions by Caoursin

Suleiman had just finished his conquest of the Balkans with a victory over Hungary at the terrible siege of Belgrade. Now, at last, he would destroy Rhodes. Suleiman sent a letter to the Grand Master urging his friendship (meaning submission or surrender), and with intimidation cited the Sultan's "...triumph over the Hungarian King, whom we have stripped of the strong fortress of Belgrade, after having wasted his territories with fire and sword, and carried away many of his people." The Grand Master replied courteously, but noted the Order's determination to always defend its homeland. The Sultan's reply was a declaration of war.

As in the great siege 42 years earlier, the villas were leveled, and all the population of Rhodes, together with all available food and forage, were brought within the walls of the city. Under the command of the outstanding Knight Commander Anthony Bosio, vessels were dispatched to Candia (Crete), Sicily, Naples and France for whatever additional supplies, armaments, and men could be obtained. For example, on Candia, Bosio was able to enlist 500 Cretan archers.

Rhodes - 1522

The Knights of St. John, or Knights Hospitallers, had captured Rhodes in the early 14th century after the loss of Acre, the last Crusader stronghold in Palestine in 1291. From Rhodes, they became an active part of the trade in the Aegean sea, and at times harassed Turkish shipping in the Levant to secure control over the eastern Mediterranean. A first effort by the Ottomans to capture the island, in 1480, was repulsed by the Order, but the continuing presence of the knights just off the southern coast of Anatolia was a major obstacle to Ottoman expansion.

The tower of St. John at the East end of the English sector. The tower was built under Grand Master Antonio Fluvian (1421–37), and it had a gate. Later a barbican was built around it under Grand Master Piero Raimundo Zacosta (1461–67). Finally the large pentagonal bulwark was built in front of it c. 1487, and the gate was removed.

Since the previous siege the fortress had received many upgrades from the new school of trace italienne, which made it much more formidable in resisting artillery. In the most exposed land-facing sectors, these included a thickening of the main wall, doubling of the width of the dry ditch, coupled with a transformation of the old counterscarp into massive outworks (tenailles), the construction of bulwarks around most towers, and caponiers enfilading the ditch. Gates were reduced in number, and the old battlement parapets were replaced with slanting ones suitable for artillery fights. A team of masons, labourers and slaves did the construction work, the Muslim slaves were charged with the hardest labor.

Gun-wielding Ottoman Janissaries and defending Knights of Saint John at the Siege of Rhodes, miniature from Süleymannâme

In 1521, Philippe Villiers de L'Isle-Adam was elected Grand Master of the Order. Expecting a new Ottoman attack on Rhodes, he continued to strengthen the city's fortifications, work that had begun after the Ottoman invasion of 1480 and the earthquake of 1481, and called upon the Order's knights elsewhere in Europe to come to the island's defence. The rest of Europe ignored his request for assistance, but some Venetian troops from Crete joined the knights, and Sir John Rawson, Prior of the Order's Irish House, came alone. The city was protected by two and, in some places three, rings of stone walls and several large bastions. The defence of the walls and bastions was assigned in sections to the different Langues into which the knights had been organized since 1301. The harbour entrance was blocked by a heavy iron chain, behind which the Order's fleet was anchored.

The Sultan assembled his fleet some 700 ships of which more than 100 were fighting galleys. He gathered his army more than 200,000 trained troops and as many as 100,000 sappers (slaves who were used to burrow under fortifications and set explosives). The armada set sail, and arrived at Rhodes on June 26, 1522. After sailing past the city to strike terror into the hearts of the defenders, a deserted area was chosen for disembarkment. It took thirteen days to unload the army, the supplies, and the hundreds of cannon some capable of firing balls nine feet in circumference.

Defending Rhodes were some 500 Knights and their servants of arms, probably fewer than 1,500 mercenaries and perhaps 4,000 Rhodian troops. There were several thousand inhabitants of Rhodes who at the arrival of the Turks entered the walled city for protection. Most lacked military training, and many were women and children. They could, however, help rebuild the walls, carry water, deliver supplies, and pray. This was, indeed, a small force to oppose the gathered might of the greatest Empire in the history of Islam. In fact, the forces of the Order at this time were slightly smaller than in the previous siege of 1480. The city, however, was at its strongest, encompassed by a double wall with thirteen towers, numerous bastions and special fortifications, a deep wide ditch around all, and the entire area commanded by cannon positioned for both frontal assault and crossfire. Every possible preparation and precaution was taken. Even the Latin and Greek Archbishops were instructed to give sermons regarding the necessity and merit of courageous resistance. Public prayers were offered imploring victory for the champions of the Cross.

Cannon of the Hospitallers at Saint-Nicholas Tower (Tour Saint-Nicolas), 1510, Rhodes. Arms of Emery d'Amboise, with Ottoman Turkish inscription. Latin inscription TURIS + S + NICOLAI + PRO + DEFÉSOR, "For the defence of Saint-Nicholas Tower". Caliber: 23.0 centimetres (9.1 in) length: 255 centimetres (100 in) weight:1,427 kilograms (3,146 lb). Remitted by Abdülaziz to Napoleon III in 1862

Almost immediately after disembarking, the bombardment began, and daily assaults were made against the fortified city attacks which failed and cost the Turks dearly due to the precision of the Rhodian cannoniers. So heavy were the losses that the invaders wanted to abandon the siege. However, after so many Turk defeats by the Order, this time the Sultan himself would command the siege. Suleiman came ashore on July 28th. His first act was to assemble his entire army, unarmed. Then he surrounded them with 15,000 of his personal guard, and because of their failures and their desire to disengage, he threatened to execute every tenth man. They prostrated themselves before him and begged mercy. There was never again talk of abandoning the field.

The spanish/french defence bastion ( also used by the english during the 1522 siege). Notice the possible siege tunnels at the bottom of the picture.

A violent, continuous, general bombardment now began. It is difficult to grasp the intensity of this siege. Once the cannonade began it rarely let up. The battle raged day and night for five months. During the day the walls would be battered into rubble, while engagements took place all around the city as thousands of Turks assaulted various fortified positions. Then, during the night, even under bombardment, the walls were rebuilt. Buildings throughout the city would be torn down and the stone used to rebuild the fortifications.

Typical of the warfare throughout this siege was the repeated heavy assault on the bulwark of the English Knights, which was several times mined. On September 4th, this wall was successfully mined and exploded, destroying 36 feet of the wall. The Turks soon gained control of this position and planted their standard. The Grand Master, praying prostrate before the altar of Saint Mary of Victory, hearing the explosion, rushed to the wall, led a furious fight to the top, and personally tore down the Turk banner. In the battle that continued for hours, more than two thousand Turks were killed. Rhodian musketeers along the wall shot down hundreds, while Knights in armor met steel with steel in hand-to-hand combat. In this engagement alone, forty-eight Knights fell. It was a heavy loss for the Turks and an irreplaceable loss for the Order, but again the Cross had held against the Crescent.

Bombard-Mortar of the Knights of Saint John, Rhodes, 1480-1500. Founded at the request of Pierre d'Aubusson, the bombard was used for close defence of the walls (100–200 metres). It fired 260 kg granite balls. The bombard weighs 3,325 kg. Musée de l'Armée.

A few days later a similar assault was launched against the bulwark of Italy, with almost identical results. Four days later, Mustapha Pasha with four battalions again assaulted the English bastion, and then the bastion of Spain. The fighting defies description, and this time the Turks lost more than three thousand brave Janissaries.

The town of Rhodes from a 15th century drawing

Then on September 24th, an all-out attack by tens of thousands was simultaneously launched on the bulwarks of Italy, Spain, England, Provence and Auvergne. Minute details of all these separate battles can be found in the Order's archives. The resistance, the heroism, almost exceeded human capabilities. Often only a few against hundreds in hand-to-hand combat. In addition, the Order's sharpshooters, even using the crude harquebus muskets of that era, were deadly. One French Knight, Francis Fornovi, shooting from the Tower of Saint George, killed more than 500 Turks during the siege.

Thus the battle continued, almost without respite, from June into December. At one stage the Grand Master, dressed in his armor, slept for thirty-four successive nights behind the entrenchment on the Spanish bastion, ready to repulse the next attack.

Eventually, nearly every principal bastion was beaten into rubble by the Turk cannon, only to find that the Order had dug new ditches and built new walls behind those that were destroyed. Moreover, while the courage and fanaticism of the Turk troops was astounding, the heroism of the Knights and the Rhodians who were fighting for their lives and for their women and children (who would be violated and put to horrible deaths if Islam prevailed) was even greater.

Rounding up captives at the siege of Rhodes

But the prolonged siege took its toll. By mid December, only a few Knights were still alive. Tens of thousands of Turks were dead. The stench of rotting bodies of men and animals hung all over the inland. Unsanitary conditions contributed to much disease. The suffering and dying of the thousands of wounded was almost unbearable. Finally, with winter approaching, the Sultan offered a truce. He had no idea how many Knights remained, and if a considerable number were still alive, and they continued to fight as they had done, the siege would be too costly for him to continue.

Similarly, the Grand Master was faced with rebellion by the civilian Rhodians and Greek citizens, and demands by the clergy for a truce. With few Knights still able to resist, L'Isle Adam agreed to negotiations.

A confusion of influences assail the senses on a walk through theold town. The stoic grandeur of the medieval fortress-like buildings seem at odds with the narrow alleyways and homespun architecture

Filled with awe for the Knights, and in sharp contrast to the usual cruel Muslim behavior, Sulei-man was magnanimous. If the Order would surrender Rhodes, the Sultan promised that the churches would not be profaned, no children would be taken from their parents, all citizens would be allowed free exercise of their religion, any and all residents of Rhodes would be free to leave the island with the Knights, those who remained would pay no tribute for five years, the Knights would depart in their own galleys and be supplied by the Turks with additional ships if needed, the Order could embark with all its property relics, consecrated vessels, records, and the artillery on board its warships, and the Turk army would retire several miles from the city while this evacuation took place. Suleiman himself came into the city to salute the Grand Master and addressed him by the title of "Father." On the first day of January 1523, L'Isle Adam and his intrepid Knights put to sea on fifty ships loaded with the Order's property, together with all those who fought with the Order, and all Christians who wished to accompany them.

Field sketch of the Fortress City of Rhodes as in 1522,

showing the initial deployment of the opposing forces 

(S III, Rhodes, c 1978)

Key:

    1. Post of France 9. Ayas Pasha

    2. Post of Germany 10. Ayas Pasha

    3. Post of Auvergne 11. Ahmed Pasha

    4. Post of Aragon 12. Qasim Pasha

    5. Post of England 13. Mustafa Pasha

    6. Post of Provence 14. Piri Pasha

    7. Post of Italy 15. Fort St. Nicholas

    8. Janissaries 16. Boom Defences

In the same year, 1523, a former Knight of the Order "who had laid aside the sword for the cowl and rosary" Cardinal Julio de Medici, was unanimously elected Pope Clement VII. In the procession following his election the great standard of the Order of Saint John was carried before the new Pontiff.

On 22 December, the representatives of the city's Latin and Greek inhabitants accepted Suleiman's terms, which were generous. The knights were given twelve days to leave the island and would be allowed to take with them their weapons and any valuables or religious icons they desired. Islanders who wished to leave could do so at any time within a three-year period. No church would be desecrated or turned into a mosque. Those remaining on the island would be free of Ottoman taxation for five years.

On 1 January 1523, the remaining knights and soldiers marched out of the town, with banners flying, drums beating and in battle armour. They boarded the 50 ships which had been made available to them and sailed to Crete (a Venetian possession), accompanied by several thousand civilians.

Source
Ancient Rhodes

Ptolemy IV Philopator

 ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

 

A statue thought to represent either Ptolemy IV Philopator or his son Ptolemy V

 

Ptolemy IV Philopator (Greek: Πτολεμαῖος Φιλοπάτωρ Ptolemaĩos Philopátōr; reigned 221–204 BC), son of Ptolemy III and Berenice II of Egypt, was the fourth Pharaoh of Ptolemaic Egypt. The decline of the Ptolemaic dynasty began under the reign of Ptolemy IV.

Gold octadrachm issued by Ptolemy IV Philopator, British Museum

Among the children of Ptolemy IV Philopator and his sister-wife Arsinoe III of Egypt was Ptolemy V Epiphanes, who married Cleopatra I Syra, daughter of Antiochus III the Great and Laodice III.

Son of Ptolemy III and Berenice II he married, according to the custom of the Ptolemies, the sister Arsinoe III in 217 BC; later, he fell into disgrace and died in unclear circumstances. During his reign he blocked the attempt of Antiochus III of Syria to take over the part of Palestine and Syria where the Ptolemies had taken advantage of the youth of Antiochus; the Syriac King was defeated at Raphia (217 BC) during what is known as the fourth war of Syria. Starting from 210 BC Ptolemy IV had associated his infant son Ptolemy V to the throne whom, upon his death, took the leadership of the Kingdom in a climate of serious unrest.

Menthu and Ptolemy IV

It must be underlined that at Raphia, Ptolemy IV, earned a victory significantly because, for the first time, a Ptolemy fought at the head of local Egyptian troops instead of mercenary soldiers. This policy of adventures, despite military successes at the end of the century III had weakened the Egyptian monarchy, who always had an increasing necessity of his indigenous subjects and so had to follow the trends of the egyptian high classes, which supported the conservative and traditionalist policies and therefore not in agreement to a strategy that would introduce Egypt within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean, away from his thousand-year political based on economic and cultural isolation.

Marble head of Ptolemy IV

Classical writers depict Ptolemy as a drunken, debauched reveller, completely under the influence of his disreputable associates, among whom Sosibius was the most prominent. At their instigation, Ptolemy arranged the murder of his mother, uncle, and brother.

Following the defection of one of Ptolemy’s best commanders, Egypt’s Syro-Palestinian territory, Coele Syria, was seriously threatened by Antiochus III, the Syrian Seleucid ruler. In 219, when the Seleucid ruler captured some of the coastal cities, Sosibius and the Ptolemaic court entered into delaying negotiations with the enemy, while the Ptolemaic army was reorganized and intensively drilled. So grave was the threat that for the first time under the Ptolemaic regime native Egyptians were enrolled into the infantry and cavalry and trained in phalanx tactics. In 218 the negotiations collapsed, and Antiochus renewed his advance, overrunning Ptolemy’s forward defenses. In the spring of 217, however, Ptolemy’s new army met the Seleucid forces near Raphia in southern Palestine, and with the help of the Egyptian phalanx Ptolemy was victorious. Although holding the initiative, the Egyptian king, on Sosibius’s advice, negotiated a peace, and the Seleucid army withdrew from Coele Syria.

After Raphia, Ptolemy married his sister, Arsinoe, who bore him a successor in 210. The Egyptians, however, sensing their power, rose in a rebellion that Polybius, the Greek historian, describes as guerrilla warfare. By 205 the revolt had spread to Upper Egypt.

To the south, Ptolemy maintained peaceful relations with the neighbouring kingdom. In the Aegean, he retained a number of islands, but, in spite of honours granted him, he refused to become embroiled in the wars of the Greek states. In Syria, also, Ptolemy avoided involvement in local struggles, though Sosibius attempted to embroil Egypt there. According to Polybius, Ptolemy’s debauched and corrupt character, rather than his diplomatic acumen, kept him clear of foreign involvements. As his reign progressed, he fell increasingly under the influence of his favourites, and around November 205 he died. His clique of favourites kept Ptolemy’s death a secret and about a year later murdered Queen Arsinoe, leaving the young successor at their mercy.

Source/Photos/Bibliography

Polybius, XV 25.2. Cf. Zenobius, V 94.
Bevan, Edwyn (1927). The House of Ptolemy: a History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty. London: Methuen. p. 233.
Deipnosophistae V 37.
Demetrius 43.4-5.
Hildegard Temporini (ed.) (1978). Politische Geschichte: (Provinzien und Randvölker: Mesopotamien, Armenien, Iran, Südarabien, Rom und der Ferne Osten)], Part 2, Volume 9. Walter de Gruyter. p. 977. ISBN 3110071754. Retrieved 1 November 2014.

http://www.britannica.com

Ptolemy IV Philopator I  - chapter 3 of E. R. Bevan's 1927 classic The House of Ptolemy [on Bill Thayer's Lacus Curtius].
Ptolemy IV - Christopher Bennett's annotated Egyptian Royal Genealogy provides detailed references to sources.
Dedication at Itanos - inscription dedicating a pool & shrine on Crete to Ptolemy IV & Arsinoë III (ca 215 BCE) [posted by Center for Study of Ancient Documents, Oxford U].
Great Revolt of the Egyptians (205-186 BCE) -  translation & explication of Greek & Egyptian sources describing the 20 year native uprising in upper Egypt that Ptolemy IV left for his heir [posted by Center for the Tebtunis Papyri (UCal at Berkeley)].
Ptolemy IV Philopator - illustrated biography by Jimmy Dunn includes bibliography [on Tour Egypt].
Ptolemy IV Philopator - Jona Lendering lists biographical data & key dates [Livius: Articles in Ancient History].

https://en.wikipedia.org

Βιογραφία από τον Christopher Bennett
Ptolemy IV Philopator, The Fourth King of Egypt's Greek Period
The House of Ptolemy,by E. R. Bevan

Battle of Thermopylae

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

Μολών λαβέ 

At Thermopylae in the late summer of 480 the Spartan king Leonidas held out for three days with a mere 300 hoplites against thousands upon thousands of the best of the Great King's troops. It has also been the site of several battles in antiquity besides this most famous one. In 279 BC the Greeks faced Brennus and his Gauls there (Paus. 10. 20-23, Justin 24. 4-8); in 191 the Romans under M. Acilius Glabrio (and teamed with Philip V) defeated Antiochus of Syria and the Aeotolians (Livy 36. 17-19, Plut. M. Cato 13); and in 1941 the New Zealanders fought a rearguard action there against the Germans, in the course of the war which interrupted the excavation begun under the direction of Sp. Marinatos in 1939.

Clearly Thermopylae was a location of great strategic importance, because it commands the pass through which one goes after traveling south from Thessaly through Lokris and into Boeotia. Holding the pass could block an invader and even turn him back, though on all three of the famous occasions the defense of the pass failed. The Athenians took up a position there in 352 and discouraged Philip II from invading. In 323 during the Lamian War, the last-ditch effort by Athens to break free from Macedonian control, the general Leosthenes blocked the Macedonian Antipater by stationing troops at Thermopylae. However, the pass at Thermopylae was not the only way south from Thessaly into Central Greece; it was merely the best and easiest route.

In 480, in 279, and in 191 the invaders were able to get over the mountains and take the defenders in the rear. Examining the question of exactly what route was taken on each occasion, although admittedly a matter of primarily antiquarian interest, nonetheless illustrates some important trends in modern historical research. It also helps to answer the question of why Thermopylae should even be thought of as a pass. Herodotus' description of the location suggests that there are cliffs on one side and the sea on the other:

The pass through Trachis into Hellas is 50 feet wide at its narrowest point. It is not here, however, but elsewhere that the way is narrowest, namely, in front of Thermopylae and behind it; at Alpeni, which lies behind, it is only the breadth of a cart-way, and it is the same at the Phoenix stream, near the town of Anthele. To the west of Thermopylae rises a high mountain, inaccessible and precipitous, a spur of Oeta; to the east of the road there is nothing but marshes and sea. (Hdt. 7. 176)

But the modern visitor to the site sees two not very imposing looking hills; they lie to the south, not to the west. This discrepancy has led some scholars to assert that Herodotus never even saw the site, and that if he could make so basic an error all of his topographical information about the site, which is copious and detailed, must not be trusted; others tried to save his credibility by positing that he saw the site around noon, so that the sun was directly overhead and it was impossible to orient himself. W. Kendrick Pritchett, who is generally credited with injecting new life into the study of ancient topography, has mounted a vigorous defense of Herodotus's reliability on this and other sites. Pritchett points out that Herodotus seems to have done a very careful study of the site despite the error over the directions; he gives many distances in stades and plethra, and his account also includes an unusually high number of obscure toponyms.

More puzzling for the tourist who arrives at the site with his Herodotus in his hand is what lies to the south of the hills, beyond the modern roadside monument: a broad expanse of scrubby ground stretching out for about four miles to the sea. It looks today like no pass at all. The reason for this is no mystery. Due to what geologists call "alluvial fans", a process by which rivers deposit silt (travertine and other sediments), the coastline of the Gulf of Malea has advanced from 3-5 miles over the last 2500 years (Kraft et al., Journal of Field Archaeology 14 (1987) 181-197). Kraft and his team calculated the sea level in 480 using a mathematical formula known as the "eustatic curve". Together with the results of radiocarbon dating on the deposits and stratographic interpretation of the layers of the new land, they were able to account for the fact that travelers of only a few centuries ago reported the pass to be much narrower than we would expect if the process of buildup were proceeding at a steady rate. Rather, according to Kraft :

Fluctuations in the width of the pass at Thermopylae [have been] common, as expected in an unstable structural configuration along the flank of a major graben (i.e. a rapidly subsiding block of the earth's crust). (187)

Kraft concluded that the pass was not more than 20-30 meters wide in 480. That was too wide for Pritchett, who attacked the findings in volume VI of his Studies in Greek Topography (Herodotus says that the pass at Thermopylae was narrower than that at Alpeni, which he puts at half a plethron or roughly 15 meters wide).

The Battle

The confrontation at Thermopylae took place in the late summer of 480. Some modern accounts seem to know exactly on what dates the battle fell, because Herodotus says (7. 206) the the festival of Apollo Carneia was on at Sparta and that the Olympic games were also in progress. This confidence about the precise dating has lately been called into question (e.g. by Sacks in CQ 1976), but it is still possible to describe the battle in terms of relative chronology and that in many ways turns out to be more revealing. For example, we know that when Xerxes and the Persian imperial army arrived at Anthela, just west of the pass, they encamped and waited for five days before attacking. The reason for this is fairly straightforward. First, although the Persians could be confident that they would outnumber the enemy, they had as yet no idea how many hoplites were waiting on the other side of the pass, hidden by a hastily reconstructed wall. Second, Xerxes was waiting for his battered fleet to catch up; it had been damaged and delayed by bad weather yet again, the hand of the gods on the side of the Greeks (7. 188, the storm off the coast of Magnesia). A quick victory over the Greek fleet would allow him to simply land troops in the rear of the enemy, obviating the advantage offered to the Greeks by the terrain at the pass.

Xerxes used the time waiting for the fleet to arrive to good advantage. First he sent a spy to see what the Greeks were doing; the astonished horseman returned to report that he had seen the Spartans stripping for exercise and fixing each other's hair. It seems unlikely that this scene aroused the contempt in the Persian commanders Herodotus said it did, at least to judge from the next move, which was to send a herald to propose that the defenders of the pass should surrender and become allies of the Great King. In return they would be allowed to depart unharmed, and they could expect to get some of the land of those who refused to surrender. This tid-bit is reported by Diodorus (11.5, derived from Ephorus) but it is credible, since Xerxes had made similar pronouncements to the other Greek states before; Herodotus rather reports it as a conference held among the Greek contingents before Xerxes had arrived (7. 207). The offer will not have been expected to sway the Spartans; indeed, Xerxes had shown a disinclination to make further overtures to the Athenians and Spartans after the heralds of Darius had been executed both at Sparta and at Athens (Hdt. 7. 133). But if we can believe Ephorus the offer did expose the differing preoccupations of the various Greek contingents. The Peloponnesians, presumably including the Tegeans, Arcadians, Corinthians, and Phlians as well as some contingent of the Spartans, were for abandoning northern Greece and falling back on the Isthmus; only the insistence of Leonidas restrained them, and naturally the Phocians and the Locrians will have opposed this idea, since the non-combatants of Phokis and Lokris were for the most part still not evacuated. This debate among the Greek states typifies the distinctive feature of their foreign relations in the period, namely that each state tended to support its own regional interests, and it is worth reflecting on how this is usually portrayed in modern historical writing. The sense one gets is often that this was the curse of the Greeks; had they only been able to cooperate better, as they did for just long enough at Salamis, they could have ruled the world, or they would never have become the subjects of the Macedonians or (later) the Romans. Perhaps our postmodern penchant for "diversity" makes it easier for us to see how such sentiments are misguided: the cultural homogeneity which greater unity and cooperation among the Greeks would have inexorably brought about, would have brought with it, as it did in the much reviled Hellenistic Age, the sapping of their creative spirit which drew its energy from that very contentiousness which marked their interrelations.

In any event Leonidas was able to hold the Greek force together. He had only 7,100 troops; Herodotus says that Xerxes had 2.5 million troops and as many again of camp followers, but the figure is widely acknowledged to be fantastic. A more realistic estimate is had by lopping off a zero: perhaps 200,000, not all of whom had arrived at Thermopylae by the time Xerxes decided he had waited long enough.

At first, the battle went entirely according to the plan of the Greeks. The narrowness of the pass at the middle gate negated the advantage of numbers for the imperial troops. Moreover, the Greek hoplite was better equipped, with his long thrusting spear, heavy hoplite shield, and body armour; the Persian had a shorter javelin-type spear, a wicker shield which did indeed provide superior mobility in the open field but was much less useful than bronze at close quarters, and thick-woven linen corselets. For two days the Spartans held off lesser elements of the imperial army: Medes and Cissians were succeeded by the crack troops, the Immortals, to little avail.

Then the tide turned when a local man, a Malian named Ephialtes, offered to show the Persians a way around the back of the defending force, a way to get past the "Middle Gate" and turn the Greek position. Xerxes agreed, sending what was left of his 10,000 "Immortals" off at dusk. The precise route taken by the Persian troops that night is disputed. The standard view used to be that the path corresponded to the gorge of the Asopos river (so e.g. Leake, Grundy, Hignett), but this has two problems. First, the Asopos river gorge is too rocky to be negotiated at night without numerous broken ankles; second, Herodotus says that the path began from the Asopos river "which flows through the gorge" and not, as the standard view insists, "where it flows through the gorge" (7. 216). Two other main candidates have been put forward: the Vardates route (favored by Myres, Burn, and Wallace); and the Chalkomata spring route, favored by Pritchett. Whichever of these two it was may never be known for certain, but both would bring the Persians to the peak of Sastano (Kallidromos) near ancient Drakospilia by dawn. From there the paths converge.

Now, according to Herodotus Leonidas had been aware from the beginning of the existence of the Anopaia path. He stationed 1000 Phokians there to stop any encircling movement. The Phokians, according to Herodotus, were taken by surprise and put up little resistance. But word got through to Leonidas that the position had been outflanked, and there seems to have been time to abandon the position and withdraw to the south before the Immortals under Hydarnes arrived. Why did Leonidas refuse? There have been various answers to this question. Herodotus represents it as an act of deliberate self-sacrifice carried out in accordance with an oracle, which had said that the death of a Spartan king would save Sparta from destruction. One may observe that the pronouncements of the oracle in the late 480's have a distinctly pro-Persian cast; it seems likely that the priests, whose job after all was to predict the future, simply believed that the victory of the Persian army, whose immense size was known well in advance of its arrival, was inevitable. It may be that this oracle, if genuine, actually meant that the recommended course of action was for the Spartans to depose one of the sitting kings and take back Demaratus as the vassal of the Persians. Alternatively it is possible that the oracle is a post-eventum falsehood, put out by the oracle and its partisans to make it appear that Apollo had successfully predicted the outcome. There is also available the so-called "military" solution to the question, as formulated by Dascalakis. He argues that Leonidas remained in order to give the allied contingents, whom he dismissed (with the exception of the Thebans and the Thespians), time to get away.

There is an interesting sidelight here which sheds light on the interstate politics of the Persian Wars. Thebes had officially surrendered to Xerxes, and in the years after the was the Thebans had a very hard time living this down. Herodotus says that the Theban contingents who remained with the Spartans did so under compulsion, but moderns have seen that this makes little sense. At so crucial a time, Leonidas would be insane to choose to have hostiles in his midst. It is more likely that the Theban contingent consisted (as Diodorus says, 11.4.7) of exiles who had opposed the surrender to Xerxes, and that Herodotus was taken in by the anti-Theban propaganda which was flying thick and fast at Athens in the years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

There is a final dispute to be noticed concerning the identity of the hill to which Herodotus says the defenders retreated before finally being overwhelmed (7. 225). Until the excavations by Marinatos, it was generally assumed that this was the westernmost of the hills, Hill 1 by the remains of the Phokian Wall. However, the excavations proved that Kolonos Hill must be identified with Hill 2, due to the discovery of a large number of arrowheads similar in type to those found at Marathon, in a well at the Agora, and on the north slope of the Acropolis. The stone lion, the memorial to the heroism of the defenders, has never been found (though there is a modern restoration in the wrong place for the tourists) nor have the bones of the dead.

Bibliography

Béquignon, Y. La vallée du Spercheios Paris, 1937.
Burn, A.R. "Thermopylae and Callidromos" [Studies presented to D.M. Robinson, vol. I, 480-489] St. Louis, 1951.
- - - - - - - Persia and the Greeks London, 1962.
- - - - - - - "Thermopylae revisited, and some topographical notes on Marathon and Plataiai" [Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory = Studies to F. Schachermeyer, New York, 1977] 89-105.
Bury, J.B. "The Campaign of Artemisium and Thermopylae" ABSA 2 (1895) 83-104.
Dascalakis, A. Problèmes historiques autour de la bataille des Thermopyles [École Française d'Athènes - Travaux et Mémoires, fasc. XII] Paris, 1962.
Evans, J.A.S. "The final problem at Thermopylae" GRBS 5 (1964) 231-237.
- - - - - - - "Notes on Thermopylae and Artemisium" Historia 18 (1969) 389-406.
Grant, J.R. "Leonidas' last stand" Phoenix 15 (1961) 14-27.
Grundy, G. B. The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries London, 1901.
Hammond, N.G.L. "Thermopylae and Artemision" in CAH IV (2nd ed., Cambridge 1978) 546-561.
Hignett, C. Xerxes' Invasion of Greece Oxford, 1963.
Kase, E.W. & G.J. Szemler "Xerxes' march through Phocis" Klio 64 (1982) 353-366.
Kontorlis, K. The Battle of Thermopylae Athens, 1972.
Kromayer, J. & Veith, G. Schlachtenatlas - griechische Abteilung Leipzig, 1922.
Leake, W.M. Travels in Northern Greece II London, 1835.
Mackay, P.A. "Procopius' de Aedeficiis and the Topography of Thermopylae" AJA 67 (1963) 241-255.
Marinatos, Sp. N. & M. Robinson "Archaeology in Greece 1938-39" JHS 59 (1939) 199-200.
- - - - - - - & E.P. Blegen "News Items from Athens" AJA 43 (1939) 699-700.
- - - - - - - Thermopylae - An Historical and Archaeological Guide Athens, 1951.
Müller, D. Topographischer Bildkommentar zu den Historien Herodots Wasmuth, 1987.
Myres, J. L. Herodotus - Father of History Oxford, 1953.
Pritchett, W. K. "New Light on Thermopylai" AJA 62 (1958) 203-213.
- - - - - - - Studies in Ancient Greek Topography - Part IV (Passes) [U.C. Pub. Class. Stud. 28] Berkeley, 1982.
- - - - - - - Studies in Ancient Greek Topography - Part V (Roads) [U.C. Pub. Class. Stud. 31] Berkeley, 1985.
Sacks, K.S. "Herodotus and the dating of the Battle of Thermopylae" CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 232-248.
Schoder, R.V. Ancient Greece from the Air London, 1974.
Simpson, R. Hope "Leonidas' decision" Phoenix 26 (1972) 1-11.
Wallace, P.W. "The Anopaia Path at Thermopylai" AJA 84 (1980) 15-23.