Gorgias - Epitaphios ("Funeral Oration," fr. 6)

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

Gorgias | Gorgias Texts | Ancient Greek Bibliography

The following preserves nearly all that remains of what doubtless was a much longer whole. It will be our second epitaphios, or "speech by the grave"; the first was Thucydides' "Periclean Funeral Oration" (2.35-46). I include Gorgias' fragmentary epitaphios (which may have been intended for the purpose of epideixis, "demonstration," rather than a specific funeral) partly to illustrate rhetorical figures, in Greek, skhēmata. (More than one ancient commentator refers to these as gorgieia skhēmata, "Gorgianic figures," after the rhetorician best known for them.) In reading, see if you can detect where I try (struggle?) to map Gorgias' use of them.

First, an important stylistic concept:

Colon, (plural, cola), a word-grouping understood not as a grammatical but rhetorical unit. The point of cola is how they relate to — echo, reinforce, contrast with — each other. A colon can be as short as a single word, as in the following tricolon (= three cola in a row): "Friends, Romans, Countrymen" (Shakespeare). Cola can be phrase-length units, as in the following (also a tricolon): "of the people, by the people, for the people" (Lincoln). Or it can consist of clauses: "we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow" (Lincoln).

Next, a catalogue of figures:

Anastrophe, when a colon begins with the same (or more or less the same) word or phrase the previous ended with: "The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors," Lincoln First Inaugural.

Antistrophe, the same word or words at the ends of successive cola ("to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together," King I Have a Dream).

Antithesis, phrases and / or sentiments whose contrast is set in high relief: "And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country" (Kennedy Inaugural Address)

Epanaphora, the use of the same word or words at the beginnings of successive cola: "Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana" (King I Have a Dream).

Homoioteleuton, rhetorical (as opposed to poetic) use of end-rhyme, especially in combination with antithesis, isocolon, or parisosis ("we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate," Lincoln Gettysburg Address).

Isocolon, the balancing of successive cola with precisely equal numbers of syllables ("we can not de-di-cate, we can not con-sec-rate" [6 and 6]).

Parisosis, the balancing of successive cola with nearly equal numbers of syllables ("we can not consecrate, we can not hallow").

Paronomasia, "(etymological) wordplay," i.e., the artful or witty use together of words sounding alike and (typically) of similar derivation, e.g., "Stars grinding, crumb by crumb, / Our own grist down to its bony face" (Sylvia Plath, All the Dead Dears — note "grinding" and "grist").

Rhetorical question, a statement posing as a question: "Who then will speak for the common good?" Barbara Jordan, 1976 Democratic National Convention Keynote Address. (ANSWER: We will, for we all must.)

Other likely figures of rhetoric, even if not mentioned above? (Click here for the "Glossary of Rhetorical Terms" page at the University of Kentucky Dept of Classics.)

Finally, a question. I have described this as an epideixis, a "show"-speech. But for all its showing, still, I wonder about the telling, what, in other words, the message might be. . . .

TEXT (trans. A. Scholtz)

For what did these men lack that men should have? What did they have that men should lack? May I find the power to say what I wish! May I find the wish to say what I must! — no target for the gods' penalty, no victim of human jealousy. For god breathed bravery into them, though death exacted a human fee from them. And often did they choose mild fairness over inflexible justice, often, fitting expression (logos) over strict legislation (nomos), deeming it an ordinance celestial, a law universal, to speak or to hold their tongue, to do or to leave undone, whatever was needed, whenever it was needful. Two virtues especially did they cultivate: brainpower and man-power, the former, intending, the latter, expending, serving those injustice afflicted, thwarting those injustice uplifted, proponents of the practical, exponents of the honorable, through judgment of right foiling madness of might, disciplined toward the disciplined, fearless against the fearless, terrifying amid the terrifying. To bear witness to this, behold: their trophy of triumph, their gift to the god — the sacrifice of themselves. No strangers were they to the spirit of war, to legitimate lust (eros), to the clash of arms, to the blessings of peace, justly devout toward the gods, attentively dutiful to parents, righteously fair toward comrades, firmly faithful to friends. Therefore, though they have died, the loss we feel has not. No, we who shall die still feel the undying absence of those no longer living.

Gorgias - Defense of Palamedes

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

Gorgias | Gorgias Texts | Ancient Greek Bibliography

In the Defense of Palamedes Gorgias describes logos as a positive instrument for creating ethical arguments (McComiskey 38). The Defense, an oration that deals with issues of morality and political commitment (Consigny 38), defends Palamedes who, in Greek mythology, is credited with the invention of the alphabet, written laws, numbers, armor, and measures and weights (McComiskey 47).

In the speech Palamedes defends himself against the charge of treason. In Greek mythology, Odysseus – in order to avoid going to Troy with Agamemnon and Menelaus to bring Helen back to Sparta – pretended to have gone mad and began sowing the fields with salt. When Palamedes threw Odysseus' son, Telemachus, in front of the plow, Odysseus avoided him, demonstrating that he was sane. Odysseus, who never forgave Palamedes for making him reveal himself, later accused Palamedes of betraying the Greeks to the Trojans. Soon after, Palamedes was condemned and killed (Jarratt 58).

In this epideictic speech, like the Encomium, Gorgias is concerned with experimenting with how plausible arguments can cause conventional truths to be doubted (Jarratt 59). Throughout the text, Gorgias presents a method for composing logical (logos), ethical (ethos) and emotional (pathos) arguments from possibility, which are similar to those described by Aristotle in Rhetoric. These types of arguments about motive and capability presented in the Defense are later described by Aristotle as forensic topoi. Gorgias demonstrates that in order to prove that treason had been committed, a set of possible occurrences also need to be established. In the Defense these occurrences are as follows: communication between Palamedes and the enemy, exchange of a pledge in the form of hostages or money, and not being detected by guards or citizens. In his defense, Palamedes claims that a small sum of money would not have warranted such a large undertaking and reasons that a large sum of money, if indeed such a transaction had been made, would require the aid of many confederates in order for it to be transported. Palamedes reasons further that such an exchange could neither have occurred at night because the guards would be watching, nor in the day because everyone would be able to see. Palamedes continues, explaining that if the aforementioned conditions were, in fact, arranged then action would need to follow. Such action needed to take place either with or without confederates; however, if these confederates were free men then they were free to disclose any information they desired, but if they were slaves there was a risk of their voluntarily accusing to earn freedom, or accusing by force when tortured. Slaves, Palamedes says, are untrustworthy. Palamedes goes on to list a variety of possible motives, all of which he proves false.

Through the Defense Gorgias demonstrates that a motive requires an advantage such as status, wealth, honour, and security, and insists that Palamedes lacked a motive (McComiskey 47-49).

So as not to overwhelm you with Gorgias, I'll include just a bit of this very interesting speech, partly to illustrate proof by probability, which can be classed with the second of Aristotle's two main varieties of rhetorical proof (Rhetoric 1355b35-1356a20):

pisteis atekhnoi, literally "proofs not involving skill," i.e., involving no "valued-added" from the study of rhetoric. Aristotle means things like eye-witness testimony, torture, written contracts, etc. ("Just the facts.")

pisteis entekhnoi, literally "proofs involving skill," i.e, involving technical rhetoric's "value-added," as follows:

Proof based on the seeming character or reliability of the speaker, who therefore has to be careful about self-presentation.

Proof through manipulating the psychological state of the listener.

Demonstrative proof, i.e., the fact or appearance of a cogently reasoned case. That will include what Aristotle terms enthumemes, "rhetorical syllogisms," or logic premised on probabilities, not certainties.

I also want to illustrate the prominence of speech (logos) as a theme in Gorgias, even in this supposed defense speech, which we need to understand as an example of epideixis. Let me briefly summarize. This is a fictitious oration by the mythical hero, Palamedes, whom Odysseus has charged with treason, and whom we find defending himself in a kind of court martial. According to myth, Odysseus, Palamedes' great rival among the Greeks fighting at Troy, contrived a fake "message" to prove that his rival had been in contact with the enemy.

TEXT (trans. A. Scholtz)

[In his prooimion, or introductory section, Palamedes hints at Odysseus' corrupt motives for prosecuting him, and hints as well that, for the jury to allow thmeselves to be persuaded by Odysseus, would be to bring shame on themselves, a theme he returns to near the end of his speech. Palamedes also insinuates that to rescue himself from an accusion as perplexing as this would require the help of an unscrupulous sophist! Finally, he alludes to the two-pronged character of the arguments that he'll offer: that the thing itself would have been very diffcult for him to carry off, that he lacked sufficient motive.]

(7) I shall now proceed to my first point (logos), namely, that I cannot have done this thing. First of all, it would have been necessary for there to have been a start to the treason, and that start would have had to be speech (logos). For prior to doing anything we're going to do, words (logos) need first to be exchanged. But if a meeting [i.e., with the enemy] had happened, still, how could there have been words? In what way could a meeting happen unless that man [Priam, king of the Trojans] had sent a messenger to me, or I to him? For without someone to bear the message, no message in writing will have arrived. But in fact, speech (logos) itself proves the impossibility of this communication. Let's assume that he and I are with each other, but how does that play out? Who is with whom? I'll tell you: A Greek with a foreigner. But how does the one listen to the other? How does the other speak to the one? I'll tell you: No how! We won't be able to understand each other's language (logos). Is there, then, an interpreter? That means yet a third witness to this necessarily secret meeting. (8) Alright, let's grant that, too (though, of course, it didn't happen). Still, it would have been necessary for pledges to be exchanged by these co-conspirators. Pledges, then, but in what form? What kind of oath? Who would place his trust in me, "Mr. Traitor"? Suppose, then that hostages were exchanged. [Hostages often served as human collateral for international agreements.] Who as hostages? I could have volunteered my brother, as there'd have been no one else. As for the foreigner [Priam], one of his sons. That would indeed have produced a solid agreement. But if that had happened, it would have been obvious to everyone!

[Palamedes goes on to argue that, among other things, for him to sell out the Greeks would have been for him to sell out everything he cherished most: his freedom, his family, his country, etc. But he also accuses Odysseus of concocting charges based not on facts but appearances (doxa) and inconsistent argument (logos).]

[Approaching the end of his speech, Palamedes now offers advice to the jury.] (34) As for you, you must pay attention not to words but facts, nor find for the prosecution with too hasty a decision, nor think that a brief moment [i.e., the duration of this trial] makes for a wiser judge than lengthy reflection, nor reckon slander more credible than direct proof. For it falls on honorable men to take pains not to go wrong, and still more, not to create a hopeless situation out of what could have been set right. And it can be set right if people think before they act, but if they act before they think, it's hopeless. And that's how it is whenever men put a man on trial for his life, which is precisely what you are doing now.

(35) So if argument (logos) could make the truth crystal clear to those listening, then what has been said would make a verdict easy to render. But since such is not the case [since logos does not offer clear proof], you must take care to watch out for my safety. You must, that is, put off your decision as long as it takes for you to reach a verdict fair and true. For you risk basing your opinion [lit., "grasping doxa"] on the mere appearance of wrongdoing, the kind of verdict that defines a juror's reputation (doxa). And men of honor prefer death to a shameful reputation (doxa). The one ends life, the other renders it diseased.

[etc.]

Gorgias - Encomium of Helen

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

Gorgias | Gorgias Texts | Ancient Greek Bibliography

Gorgias ushered in rhetorical innovations involving structure and ornamentation and the introduction of paradoxologia – the idea of paradoxical thought and paradoxical expression. For these advancements, Gorgias has been labeled the "father of sophistry" (Wardy 6). Gorgias is also known for contributing to the diffusion of the Attic dialect as the language of literary prose. Gorgias was the first orator to develop and teach a "distinctive style of speaking" (Matsen, Rollinson and Sousa, 33).

Gorgias’ extant rhetorical works—Encomium of Helen (Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον), Defense of Palamedes (Ὑπέρ Παλαμήδους ἀπολογία), On Non-Existence (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως), and Epitaphios—come to us via a work entitled Technai (Τέχναι), a manual of rhetorical instruction, which may have consisted of models to be memorized and demonstrate various principles of rhetorical practice (Leitch, et al. 29). Although some scholars claim that each work presents opposing statements, the four texts can be read as interrelated contributions to the up-and-coming theory and art (technē) of rhetoric (McComiskey 32). Of Gorgias’ surviving works, only the Encomium and the Defense are believed to exist in their entirety.

Encomium of Helen

Gorgias

(1) The order proper to a city is being well-manned; to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and the opposites of these are disorder. And the praiseworthy man and woman and discourse and work and city-state and deed one must honor with praise, while one must assign blame to the unworthy--for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.

(2) It being required of the same man both to speak straight and to refute [crooked speech, one should refute] those blaming Helen, a woman concerning whom the testimony of those who are called poets has become univocal and unanimous--likewise the repute of her name, which has become a byword for calamities. And by bestowing some rationality on the discourse, I myself wish to absolve this ill-reputed woman from responsibility, and to show that those who blame her are lying--and, having shown the truth, to put an end to ignorance.

(3) It is not unclear, not even to a few, that the woman who is the subject of this discourse was the foremost of the foremost men and women, by nature and by birth. For it is clear that her mother was Leda and her father was in fact the god, but said to be mortal, Tyndareus and Zeus--of whom the one, by being, seemed, while the other, by speech, was disproved--and the one was the mightiest of men while the other was tyrant over all.

(4) Born of such parentage, she had godlike beauty, which having received she not inconspicuously retained. She produced the greatest erotic desires in most men. For one body many bodies of men came together, men greatly purposing great things, of whom some possessed great wealth, some the glory of ancient and noble lineage, some the vigor of personal strength, and others the power of acquired cleverness. And they were all there together out of contentious love and unconquerable ambition.

(5) Who it was, then, who fulfilled the love by gaining Helen, and the means and manner of it, I shall not say; for to tell knowing people things they know supplies corroboration but does not convey enjoyment. Having now finished the first section, I shall advance to the beginning of the next section, and I shall set out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about.

(6) Either by the wishes of Fortune and plans of the gods and decrees of Necessity she did what she did, or abducted by force, or persuaded by speeches, <or conquered by Love>. Now in the first case, the responsible party deserves the responsibility. For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought. For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for the superior to lead and the inferior to follow. And a god is superior to a human being in force, intelligence, etcetera. Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.

(7) But if she was abducted by force, unlawfully constrained and unjustly victimized, it is clear on the one hand that the abductor, as victimizer, committed injustice--and on the other hand that the abductee, as victim, met with mishap. Accordingly the barbarian assailant deserves to meet with barbarous assault, by speech and custom and deed--deserves to be blamed in speech, dishonored by custom, and penalized indeed. She who was forced and bereft of fatherland and orphaned of friends--how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled? For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him.

(8) And if persuasive discourse deceived her soul, it is not on that account difficult to defend her and absolve her of responsibility, thus: discourse is a great potentate, which by the smallest and most secret body accomplishes the most divine works; for it can stop fear and assuage pain and produce joy and make mercy abound. And I shall show that these things are so: (9) explanation to the audience, by means of opinion, is required. Discourse having meter I suppose and name (in the general sense) to be poetry. Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and sorrowful longing come upon those who hear it, and the soul experiences a peculiar feeling, on account of the words, at the good and bad fortunes of other people's affairs and bodies. But come, let me proceed from one section to another.

(10) By means of words, inspired incantations serve as bringers-on of pleasure and takers-off of pain. For the incantation's power, communicating with the soul's opinion, enchants and persuades and changes it, by trickery. Two distinct methods of trickery and magic are to be found: errors of soul, and deceptions of opinion.

(11) Those who have persuaded and do persuade anyone about anything are shapers of lying discourse. For if all people possessed memory concerning all things past, and awareness of all things present, and foreknowledge of all things to come, discourse would not be similarly similar; hence it is not now easy to remember the past or consider the present or foretell the future; so that most people on most subjects furnish themselves with opinion as advisor to the soul. But opinion, being slippery and unsteady, surrounds those who rely on it with slippery and unsteady successes.

(12) Accordingly what cause hinders Helen ... praise-hymn came ... similarly would ... not being young ... just as if ... means of forcing ... force was abducted. For the mind of Persuasion was able ... and even if necessity ... the form will have ... it has the same power. For discourse was the persuader of the soul, which it persuaded and compelled to believe the things that were said and to agree to the things that were done. He who persuaded (as constrainer) did wrong; while she who was persuaded (as one constrained by means of the discourse) is wrongly blamed.

(13) Persuasion belonging to discourse shapes the soul at will: witness, first, the discourses of the astronomers, who by setting aside one opinion and building up another in its stead make incredible and obscure things apparent to the eyes of opinion; second, the necessary debates in which one discourse, artfully written but not truthfully meant, delights and persuades a numerous crowd; and third, the competing arguments of the philosophers, in which speed of thought is shown off, as it renders changeable the credibility of an opinion.

(14) The power of discourse stands in the same relation to the soul's organization as the pharmacopoeia does to the physiology of bodies. For just as different drugs draw off different humors from the body, and some put an end to disease and others to life, so too of discourses: some give pain, others delight, others terrify, others rouse the hearers to courage, and yet others by a certain vile persuasion drug and trick the soul.

(15) It has been said that if she was persuaded by discourse, she did no wrong but rather was unfortunate; I proceed to the fourth cause in a fourth section. If it was love that brought all these things to pass, she escapes without difficulty from the blame for the sin alleged to have taken place. For the things we see do not have whatever nature we will, but rather that which befalls each. The soul receives an impression in its own ways through the sight.

(16) For example, whenever hostile bodies put on their bronze and iron war-gear of ward and defense against enemies, if the visual sense beholds this, it is troubled and it troubles the soul, so that often panic-stricken men flee future danger <as if it were> present. For the strong habitual force of law is banished because of the fear prompted by the sight, which makes one heedless both of what is judged by custom to be admirable, and of the good that comes about by victory.

(17) Some who have seen dreadful things have lost their presence of mind in the present time; thus fear extinguishes and drives out understanding. And many fall into useless troubles and terrible diseases and incurable dementias; thus sight engraves in the mind images of things seen. And the frightening ones, many of them, remain; and those that remain are just like things said.

(18) But truly whenever the painters perfectly complete one body and figure from many colors and bodies, they delight the sight; and the making of statues and production of figurines furnishes a pleasant sight to the eyes. Thus it is in the nature of the visual sense to long for some things and for other things to give it pain. And in many there is produced much love and desire for many things and bodies.

(19) Accordingly, if Helen's eye, taking pleasure in Alexander's body, transmitted to her soul the eagerness and struggle of Love, is it any wonder? If Love, <being> a god, <has> the divine power of gods, how could the weaker being have the power to reject this and to ward it off? But if it is a human disease and an error of the soul, it ought not to be blamed as a sin but ought rather to be accounted a misfortune. For she went, as she started out, in the clutches of fortune, not by plans of the mind; and by the constraints of love, not the preparations of art.

(20) How then is it necessary to regard as just the blame of Helen, who either passionately in love or persuaded by discourse or abducted by force or constrained by divine constraints did the things she did, escaping responsibility every way?

(21) By this discourse I have removed infamy from a woman; I have continued in the mode I established at the beginning. I tried to put an end to the injustice of blame and ignorance of opinion; I wanted to write the discourse, Helen's encomium and my plaything. 

Brian Donovan's copyright notice

Translation ©1999 by Brian R. Donovan. This translation is offered by the translator (a Professor of English at Bemidji State University) for the free and unrestricted use of students, teachers, and scholars everywhere, consistent with academic integrity. The translation may be non-commercially reproduced in full in any format, provided that such reproduction includes this copyright notice. Quotations from this translation should be accompanied by due acknowledgment of their source. Commercial publishers wishing to make use of this translation should contact the translator.

Translator's Note

The source text is that of H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1952, rpt. Dublin 1966), as reproduced on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae CD ROM #D (compilation ©1992 by the Regents of the University of California). Other available translations are those by George Kennedy, in Rosamond Kent Sprague (ed.) The Older Sophists (Columbia: U. of South Carolina P., 1972, rpt. 1990), and by Kathleen Freeman in her Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1948).

I have made no attempt here to reproduce or imitate the obtrusively artful and paronomastic style of the original, as Kennedy did; rather, my focus has been on reproducing literal meaning. Where the literal meaning of this translation differs from Kennedy's translation and/or Freeman's, I would suggest that all three versions represent valid optional interpretations.

Notable among my departures from the lead of Kennedy and Freeman are my division of the discourse into five Roman-numbered sections, and my fragmented rendition (in italics) of the first half of Arabic-numbered section 12. All but the last of the Roman-numbered sections are explicitly identified as distinct sections, in my view, by the original's use of the term logos, which in these instances I have translated "section"; and the last seems obviously enough a distinct peroration or coda. As to the first half of Arabic-numbered section 12, which Diels/Kranz aptly describes as "heillos verderbt," I have opted for the admittedly peculiar procedure of "translating" the unemended original mess, partly because Freeman and Kennedy had already gone the other way, translating from the emended Greek version suggested in the Diels/Kranz apparatus. This was thus the road less traveled.